We use multinomial values to study the effects of the partnership formation in cooperative games, comparing the joint effect on the involved players with the alternative alliance formation. The simple game case is especially considered and the application to the Catalonia Parliament (Legislature 2003(Legislature -2007) is also studied.
Introduction
The notion of coalition of partners or partnership -as it will be called here -was introduced in [16] . In [3] the significance and scope of this concept were emphasized, first in cooperative games and later on for simple games, and the natural way to impose partnerships in a given game by means of commitments between players was also suggested. In the present paper we focus on a subfamily of probabilistic values called multinomial (probabilistic) values. These values were introduced in reliability by Puente [20] (see also [15] ) with the name of ''multibinary probabilistic values''. They were independently defined by Carreras [4] , for simple games only -i.e. as power indices -in a work on decisiveness where they were called ''Banzhaf α-indices''. Recently, Carreras and Puente [11] have given two characterizations of the multinomial values within the class of probabilistic values: one for each value and another for the whole family.
For more than a decade, our research group has been studying semivalues, a subfamily of probabilistic values introduced by Dubey et al. [14] , characterized by anonymity, and including the Shapley value as the only efficient member. In the analysis of certain cooperative problems we have successfully used binomial semivalues [20] that include the Banzhaf value introduced by Owen [17] . 1 From this experience, we feel that multinomial values (n parameters, n being the number of players) offer a deal of flexibility clearly greater than binomial semivalues (one parameter) and hence many more possibilities to introduce additional information when evaluating a game.
The aim of this paper is the application of multinomial values to study the effects of the partnership formation. Our first goal is to investigate how these values are modified if several players agree to form a partnership and generalize the previous results found by using binomial semivalues in [10] . Our second goal is the study of a real life political instance: the Catalonia Parliament during the Legislature 2003 Legislature -2007 .
The organization of the paper is then as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries is provided. In Section 3, general statements for cooperative games are first given and concern the variation of the multinomial values, when a partnership is formed, and refer to (a) inner players and (b) outside players; next, a comparison is established between the multinomial values of the coalition as (i) a partnership and (ii) an alliance. In Section 4, we analyze partnerships in simple games: in this case, we determine the maximum and minimum values of the differences found for any multinomial value in the three cases mentioned above and supply games where these extreme values are attained. Proofs of the statements in Sections 3 and 4 will be found in Appendices A and B, respectively. Section 5 contains the analysis of the Catalonia Parliament if a partnership is formed. Finally, Section 6 states some conclusions.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote a finite set of players. A cooperative game in N is a function v : 
Probabilistic values
N is a (group) probabilistic value iff it satisfies the following properties:
(ii) positivity
There is an interesting characterization of the probabilistic values, also in [23] : (a) given a set of n2 n−1 weighting coeffi-
defines a probabilistic value φ on N; (b) conversely, every probabilistic value can be obtained in this way; (c) the correspondence given by {p i S : i ∈ N, S ⊆ N\{i}}  → φ is one-to-one.
Thus, the payoff that a probabilistic value allocates to every player in any game is a weighted sum of his marginal contributions in the game. We quote from [23] :
''Let player i view his participation in a game v as consisting merely of joining some coalition S and then receiving as a reward his marginal contribution to the coalition. If p i S is the probability that he joins coalition S, then φ i [v] is his expected payoff from the game''.
Among the probabilistic values, semivalues, introduced by Dubey et al. [14] , are characterized by the anonymity property:
Alternatively, this is equivalent to saying that, if n = |N|, there is a vector {p s } n−1 s=0 such that p i S = p s for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ N\{i}, where s = |S|, so that all coalitions of a given size share a common weight that applies to all (external) players, and hence Eq. (1) reduces to Finally, the multilinear extension (Owen [18] ) of a game v ∈ G N is the real-valued function defined on R n by
As is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any game v can be obtained from its multilinear extension. Indeed, ϕ [v] can be calculated by integrating the partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the main diagonal x 1 = x 2 = · · · = x n of the cube [0, 1] n [18] , while the partial derivatives of that multilinear extension evaluated at point (1/2, 1/2, . . . , 1/2) give β[v] [17] .
Multinomial (probabilistic) values
The multinomial (probabilistic) values were introduced by Puente [20] (see also Freixas and Puente [15] and Carreras and Puente [12, 13] ) as follows.
be given. Then the coefficients
(where the empty product, arising if S = ∅ or S = N\{i}, is taken to be 1) define a probabilistic value on G N that will be called the p-multinomial value and denoted as λ p . Thus,
Although agreeing with Weber's [23] interpretation of the weighting coefficient p i S as the probability that player i joins coalition S, we feel that the collection {p i S : i ∈ N, S ⊆ N\{i}} defining a probabilistic value contains, in general, too many parameters to be precisely determined and handled for discussion in most cases in practice. On the contrary, the weighting
s=0 defining a semivalue [14] , and particularly parameter q in the binomial case [20, 2] , may well lack the necessary flexibility to deal with players' behavior since, precisely, they are not able, because of their anonymity, to discriminate among players. Thus, using profiles p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ), which define multinomial values, appears as an intermediate and reasonably balanced possibility between both extreme cases, since these vectors provide just one parameter per player. Therefore we will attach to p i the meaning of generical tendency of player i to form coalitions, and will assume that p i and p j are independent of each other whenever i ̸ = j. Thus we will say that p is a (tendency) profile on N. According to Eq. (3), this implies that coefficient p i S , the probability of i to join S, will depend on the positive tendencies of the members of S to form coalitions and also on the negative tendencies in this sense of the outside players, i.e. the members of N\(S ∪ {i}). 
Thus, the payoff allocated by λ p to player i does not depend on p i but only on p j . If player j is not greatly interested in cooperating, and hence p j is small, player i mainly receives his individual utility whereas, otherwise, if player j is interested in cooperating, and hence p j is great, player i mainly receives his marginal contribution to the grand coalition.
(b) It is easy to check that the action of λ p on an unanimity game u T is given by:
where s = |S| and 0 0 = 1 by convention in cases q = 0 and q = 1. These coefficients {p s } 
As is shown in [20] , the multilinear extension procedure extends well to all binomial semivalues. In [20, 15] , the method is also extended to any multinomial value: if λ p is such a value and f is the multilinear extension of game v ∈ G N then
Partnerships

Definition 2.3 ([16]). A coalition
A partnership is a coalition that possesses a trivial internal structure and behaves in some sense like an individual member, since all of its strict subcoalitions are powerless (if we set R = ∅ then v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S). The formation of a partnership suggests for the involved players a way to obtain strategic advantages. The partnership condition demands more than an agreement to coordinate strategies, since it also forbids any deal or bargain between strict subsets and external groups of players and restricts, then, the set of available worths. The case where only one coalition S (with |S| ≥ 2) turns into a partnership will be the only considered throughout this paper. In this case, the partnership formation is stated as follows.
Definition 2.4 ([3]
). Let v be a game in N and ∅ ̸ = S ⊆ N. The partnership game v S in N (where S clearly becomes a partnership) is defined by
It is easy to see that any two players i, j of a partnership S in a game v are symmetric in v S .
Example 2.5. Assume that three nearby towns wish to get some supply from a distribution center. By, say, geographic reasons, the contract for a single town amounts to 1000 units of money but a reduced cost of 1860 units is offered by the supplier to towns 1 and 2 for a joint contract and, similarly, a cost of 1900 units is offered to towns 1 and 3. Finally, the supplier tenders a contract involving all towns at a price of 2790 units.
The game v, defined in N = {1, 2, 3}, that assigns to each coalition the cost savings derived from a joint contract of its members with the supplier is given by v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and
If towns 2 and 3 agree to reject the possibility of a contract joining either to town 1 -it does not mean that they form a coalition, which would give no profit to them -then this implies that coalition S = {2, 3} turns into a partnership, and a new game v S arises. As v S = 210u N , the unanimity game on N, towns 2 and 3 are now better placed to bargain with town 1.
Partnership formation
The multinomial values will be used here to measure the internal and external effects of the partnership formation.
Jointly with the p-multinomial value of each player λ p i [v] , it will be useful to consider the (additive) p-multinomial value of a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N in a game v, defined in a natural way by
Partnership game vs. original game
In particular, if v = v S , the partnership game introduced in Definition 2.4, the partnership p-multinomial value of S is
For all v ∈ G N and S ⊆ N (|S| ≥ 2), we will consider the insider and outsider increments
] for each j ∈ N\S and the additive increment
As for the convenience to form partnership S, it seems important, in principle, that
[v] > 0 holds, some kind of utility redistribution within S might be expected which satisfies all its players. Then we can consider that the partnership formed by coalition S ⊆ N in v, which gives rise to v S , is positive if
The next statement provides expressions for the above increments. Note that, a priori, players j ∈ N\S are expected to be damaged by the partnership formation and hence their increment is defined in a way opposed to the definition for players i ∈ S. To ease the notation, if i ∈ T we will use T i for T \{i}. 
Remark 3.3. Corollary 3.2 states that, in monotonic games, the two-player partnership formation can be positive if, in particular, there is at least one player with a rather great tendency to form coalitions (p i ≥ 1/2 or p j ≥ 1/2). It also gives bounds for the increase or decrease of the additive value of the coalition, once it becomes a partnership, in terms of p i + p j and v(N). 
Assume that coalition S = {1, 2} turns into a partnership and hence a new game v S arises. We study whether the constitution of the partnership is interesting for its members by using the Shapley and Banzhaf values and comparing these results with the multinomial values (see Table 1 ).
(a) According to the Shapley and Banzhaf values, player 1 gets profit from the partnership formation, whereas player 2 does not. On the other hand, players 3 and 4 are damaged by the partnership formation. (b) According to the multinomial values, we obtain:
This shows that for all p ∈ (0, 1) 4 , players 3 and 4 are damaged by the partnership formation. If p 2 > 1/2 player 1 gets profit from the partnership formation whereas the result over player 2 depends on the profile p. Finally, for S = {1, 3}, the partnership formation is globally null in the neutral case, in fact player 3 gains some amount (17/60), which player 1 loses.
Partnership vs. alliance
A coalition structure or system of unions in N is a partition B = {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B m } of this set. A game with a coalition structure is a pair [v; B] where v ∈ G N and B is a coalition structure in N. The quotient game v B is the game played by the unions, or, rather, by the set M = {1, 2, . . . , m} of their representatives, as follows:
Here we shall only deal with coalition structures where just one nonempty coalition S ⊆ N (with |S| ≥ 2) forms. In this case, it will be useful to denote as [S] such a coalition structure. Given ∅ ̸ = S ⊆ N, we will denote by λ p 0 [v [S] ] the p-multinomial value of the representative of S in the quotient game v [S] played in M = {0} ∪ N\S (a non-standard notation that seems, however, more suitable in this special case, where 0 represents S and each j ∈ N\S represents himself). In this case p is the tendency profile induced by p in M with p i = p i for all i ∈ N\S and, among the infinite many possibilities to define p 0 in terms of p, let us suggest a few ones:
We will not discuss here which is the best option (if any). The theory developed in this paper will be of application provided that p is a profile induced by p, no matter by which option.
We will compare λ
Given a set of players S, the following statement will be useful to determine the cases where the formation of a partnership is more interesting than the effective constitution of a coalition in the very sense of the term (that is why we use the term ''alliance'' to distinguish it from ''coalition'', commonly understood as a mere synonymous of ''subset of N''). 
Corollary 3.7. Let v be a monotonic game in N and S ⊆ N be such that |S| ≥ 2. Then: 
√
3 for all i ∈ S, and so on. In general, increasing the number of involved players requires that the tendency to forming coalitions of all of them increases in order to get more profit from forming a partnership than an alliance. In 3.7(d), bounds for the difference are provided in terms of s, q M , q m and v(N).
Partnerships in simple games
Simple games form an interesting class of cooperative games, not only as a test bed for many cooperative concepts but also for the variety of their interpretations, in political science and other fields. In particular, they have been often applied to describe and analyze collective decision-making mechanisms, and the notion of voting power has been closely attached to them. We will specialize here on this class of games.
A game v in N is simple if it is monotonic, v(T ) = 0 or 1 for every T ⊆ N, and v(N) = 1. For example, the unanimity game u S , for any nonempty S ⊆ N, is simple. A coalition T ⊆ N is winning in v if v(T ) = 1 (otherwise it is called losing), and W = W (v) denotes the set of winning coalitions in v. Due to monotonicity, the set W m of all minimal winning coalitions determines W and hence the game. A simple game v is a weighted majority game if there are nonnegative weights w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n allocated to the players and a positive quota q such that
We then write v = [q; w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ]. (For additional details on simple games we refer the reader to e.g. [8, 22, 7] or [5] .) We denote as SG N the set of all simple games in N. Endowed with the standard composition laws, given by [4] , an alternative interpretation in simple games of the profile that defines a multinomial value is as follows. There is a status quo Q and a proposal P to modify it. The action of the parliamentary members reduces voting for or against P. Then each p i can be viewed as the probability that player i votes for P. Since the result of a vote is essentially equivalent to forming a coalition (the coalition of players that vote for P), this interpretation of p i agrees with that of ''tendency to form a coalition'' that we are using in this paper.
In this section we determine the maximum and minimum values of the increments
, when v ranges SG N , as a generalization of the results obtained in [10] . n and each such S: [v] reaches its maximum value can also be described by W m = {{i, j} : i ∈ S}, so that j is the only veto player (i.e. belongs to every winning coalition but is not a dictator), S is a blocking coalition (i.e. losing but powerful enough to prevent N\S to win) and the remaining players k ̸ ∈ S ∪ {j} are null. Of course, v = [q; w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ] where w i = 1 for each i ∈ S, w j = s, w k = 0 for any k ̸ ∈ S ∪ {j}, and q = s + 1. Besides, 
(again, an alternative but not easier computation of the minimum). 
and it is attained for v = u S ; the minimum value is 0 and it is attained in any game v where all members of S are null players. Indeed, from Corollary 3.7 it follows that:
• For p i = 0 for all i ∈ N, the maximum is 0 and it is attained in all games where S ̸ ∈ W , whereas the minimum is −1 and it is attained in all games where S ∈ W . • Instead, for p i = 1 for all i ∈ N, the maximum is s − 1 and it is attained in all games where N\S ̸ ∈ W , whereas the minimum is 0 and it is attained in all games where N\S ∈ W . 
(an alternative way to derive the extreme no-null value in both cases).
The Catalonia Parliament, Legislature 2003-2007
In this section, we shall apply multinomial values to the analysis of a political structure.
The political framework
We In Catalonia, politics is based on two main axes: the classical left-to-right axis and an orthogonal axis going from Spanish centralism to Catalanism (Catalan nationalism) (see Fig. 1 ). In 2003, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a radical nationalist and left-wing party, was faced with the dilemma of choosing between either a Catalanist majority coalition with Convergència i Unió (CiU) or a left-wing majority coalition with the Partitp dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV). Thus, the role of ERC in this scenario would be crucial. Nevertheless, a previous partnership formation concerning PSC and ICV would have been only natural by ideological reasons.
Initial evaluation
Under the standard absolute majority rule, and assuming voting discipline within parties, the structure of this parliamentary body can be represented by the weighted majority game v ≡ [68; 46, 42, 23, 15, 9] . Therefore, the strategic situation is given by
so that players 2 and 3 on one hand, and 4 and 5 on the other, are symmetric in v.
The introduction of tendency profiles will break these symmetries. Nevertheless, a structural symmetry still exists, between λ 
To be or not to be (in a previous partnership)
We wish to investigate here the effects of PSC and ICV turning into a partnership by applying the multinomial values λ p to games v and v S , where S = {2, 5}. Following [3] , we get v S from v by inserting, in each minimal winning coalition T ∈ W m containing some member of S, the remaining members of S (if any), and removing, finally, the members of the new family that are not minimal. This gives rise to
All multinomial values applied in this section have been computed using derivations of the multilinear extension technique (5) that can be found in [15] . The results of applying multinomial values to the two games mentioned before are given in Table 2 . Now, we look at Table 2 , where the effects of S = {2, 5} turning into a partnership are described. By comparing λ 
It is difficult, in principle, to say anything of interest about the expressions for ∆ S i λ p [v] . Fortunately, a simplification can be reasonably achieved. Indeed, the almost isolated political position of PPC (party 4) with regard to the remaining parties strongly suggests taking p 4 ≈ 0, which will make things easier:
In this case the insider increments become negative and positive respectively for all p ∈ (0, 
The above assumption p 4 ≈ 0 will reduce to:
This shows that for all p ∈ (0, 1) 5 with p 4 ≈ 0, CiU is damaged by the partnership formation whereas ERC gets profit from it.
• PPC is fully damaged by the partnership formation since it becomes a null player in v S .
Partnership vs. alliance
Assume that players 2 and 5 form an alliance S = {2, 5}. We study if the formation of the previous partnership is more interesting than the effective constitution of this alliance. [S] ] because the payoffs to the members of a union depend only on the tendencies of the remaining unions, that, in this case, reduce to a singleton {j} and p j = p j , for j ∈ N\S. We obtain
According to Corollary 3.7 the partnership formation is more advantageous than the alliance formation if p 2 + p 5 > 1.
Conclusions
We have used multinomial values to measure the effects of the partnership formation in a game as a generalization of the study done by using binomial semivalues in [10] , whose monoparametric condition implies a limited capability of analysis of such situations. These values form an n-parametric family depending on p ∈ [0, 1] n on which they offer a new view. Profile p has been given a probabilistic interpretation and supplies information not included in the characteristic function of the game. By using multinomial values we get a much more precise approach to the influence of players' different personalities on the partnership formation problem. The reader is referred to the example of Catalonia Parliament (Section 5) for a detailed analysis. This influence, and hence the increase of strategic options for the different parties, cannot be discovered by merely using the traditional and more rigid values: it arises from the possibility to attach a parameter to each player, which is just the characteristic of the multinomial values. The fact that they are based on tendency profiles provide new tools to assume a wide variety of situations from players' personality when playing a given game.
The partnership formation involve any group of players in any game and it gives rise to a new game. We have compared the effects of the partnership formation, with regard to the original game, in the following situations (a) for the members of the partnership, the insider increment, (b) for the remaining players, the outsider increment, and (c) a comparison for all the partnership members, the additive value, in the partnership game and its value as a player in the quotient game that arises from the alliance formation is also useful to decide which strategy is better. Moreover, in the case of simple games we also determine the maximum and minimum values for the differences found in cases (a)-(c), and provide games where these extreme values are attained.
Future work might concern (a) the study of mixed situations between coalition structures and partnerships formations by extending the p-multinomial values to games with a coalition structure (the coalitional p-multinomial value [13] ) in a similar way than the symmetric binomial coalitional semivalue [1, 10, 12] extends the binomial semivalue in these games (we are already working on it). They apply to games with a coalition structure by combining the Shapley value and the multinomial values. Here we first apply the p-multibinary probabilistic value λ p in the quotient game to get a payoff for each union; next, we use within each union the Shapley value, to share the payoff efficiently by applying it to a reduced game played in that union. (b) The study of two or more coalitions forming partnerships. ] vanishes is by forcing the sum to be empty. This happens in any game where, for all T ∈ W such that S ⊆ T , we have T \S ∈ W , and this means that all members of S are null players in this game.
(b) The proof follows the same guidelines as in (a).
